Nov 06, 2026 · 6 min read
APT29 Targets iPhone and Android Through Trusted Websites
French security firm Sekoia says Russia's APT29 planted exploit code on real websites and a Ukrainian analytics tracker. One page view on an outdated phone was enough.
No phishing email, no booby trapped attachment. The bait was a website people already trusted, such as a Ukrainian gas producer or a US chemical industry trade association. Load the page on an old iPhone or outdated Chrome for Android, and hidden code decided whether your phone was worth robbing.
The headlines call it zero click espionage. That is half right, and the half that is wrong decides how you defend yourself.
Key Takeaways
- Sekoia assessed with moderate to high confidence that APT29, the hacking group widely attributed to Russia's SVR foreign intelligence service, ran a mobile watering hole campaign it disclosed on November 4, 2026.
- Between 27 August and 3 September 2026, the attackers poisoned the Ukrainian Plerdy analytics tracker; they also planted exploit code on hacked sites and on fakes of America250 and a London luxury hotel.
- DarkSword, the iOS exploit chain used against iPhones on iOS 18.5, harvested messages, Mail indexes, Keychain passwords, WhatsApp and Telegram data, photos and location caches.
- Infection came from visiting a web page, not from a message or email, and Sekoia says a fully updated phone is safe because every flaw was patched before the campaign began.
Who Is Behind the Campaign, and How Sure Is Sekoia?
Sekoia blames APT29, also tracked as Midnight Blizzard and Cozy Bear, and writes in its Poisoned Source report that "we assess with moderate to high confidence that this campaign was conducted by APT29." The hedge matters: Sekoia credits "APT29, or at least one of its subgroups."
It fits a pattern. In August 2024, Google's Threat Analysis Group linked APT29, with moderate confidence, to watering holes on Mongolian government sites that served iPhone and Chrome exploits copied from Intellexa and NSO Group. Same playbook two years later: borrow spyware vendors' exploits, aim them at phones that never updated.
In March, Google tied earlier DarkSword watering holes on Ukrainian sites to UNC6353, a suspected Russian espionage group. Sekoia never mentions UNC6353, so any overlap is unverified.
How Did the Phones Get Infected?
Victims were infected by loading a poisoned web page, which Sekoia calls infection "without user interaction." Nothing arrived by message, iMessage or email. The attackers used three routes:
- Hacked legitimate sites. Besides the gas producer and trade association, Sekoia lists a Bulgarian military related site and a far right European political party.
- Lookalike proxies.
america250[.]holidaymirrored the US 250th anniversary initiative andtheowo[.]clubmirrored the Raffles London at The OWO hotel. Sekoia says the operators "may have sought to target diplomatic delegations." - A poisoned tracker. For one week, the compromised Plerdy analytics script exposed "hundreds of legitimate websites and their visitors" to the exploit kit. Sekoia elsewhere says "thousands of predominantly Ukrainian websites" and gives no exact count.
A script called UltimateFingerprinter read each visitor's operating system and browser version and served only a matching exploit. Note the vehicle: an analytics tag, the kind sites paste in without review, became an exploit server.
What Did the Spyware Steal?
Payloads varied by device:
- Class A, iOS 16 to 17.4: app and browser cookies only, via CVE-2025-43529 and CVE-2024-27834.
- Class B, iOS 18.5: the DarkSword chain (CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, CVE-2025-43520), which took SMS and iMessage, Mail indexes, Keychain passwords and tokens, WhatsApp and Telegram databases, contacts, call history, Notes, Safari history, photos, iCloud Drive and location caches.
- Class C, Chrome 139 to 145 on Android: CVE-2026-3910 in Chrome plus CVE-2025-27038 in the Qualcomm Adreno GPU driver, delivering a payload Sekoia named AndroSnitch that took Chrome cookies, saved logins, history and Wi-Fi passwords.
Sekoia calls DarkSword "a suspected Commercial Surveillance Vendor-developed iOS exploit kit." Every chain ran "without establishing persistence," a smash and grab: a reboot evicts the code but not the consequences. Sekoia has not said how many phones were compromised. iVerify's newest data suggests the scale: criminals now account for most of the iPhone spyware infections it detects.
What This Means for Your Inbox
Email was not the way in, but it was on the shopping list. The iOS harvester grabbed "the Mail indexes (Envelope Index and Protected Index)" along with Accounts3.sqlite and Keychain tokens. Sekoia does not say whether full message bodies left the phone. Even an index of who writes to you is the map source protection exists to hide.
Stolen cookies and tokens are the longer lasting risk, since a webmail session cookie can work without your password or second factor until revoked. Russian services keep going after mailboxes, from APT29 tricking targets into handing over Gmail app passwords to the separate operation that read 90 days of Zimbra email with no click. If your phone was outdated during the campaign window, treat your email sessions as exposed.
Was This Really Zero Click, and Were the Exploits New?
Partly, and no. Sekoia uses the phrase "two zero-click CVE exploits" only for the Class A chain. The victim still had to load an infected page, a drive by attack, unlike the message based WhatsApp takeover on iOS 16 earlier this year. None of the bugs was new: "Each flaw was resolved by the respective vendor before this campaign began."
Google shipped the Chrome fix for CVE-2026-3910 on March 12, 2026, according to the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. The Plerdy compromise started August 27, so the Android chain only worked on phones at least 168 days, or 24 weeks, behind on Chrome updates. APT29 was not betting on secret bugs. It was betting on neglect.
Which Indicators Should Defenders Block?
Search DNS and proxy logs for these domains from Sekoia's indicator list, which also lists SHA256 hashes; Sekoia shares more with national CERTs under TLP:AMBER:
static.flux-telemetry[.]comandedge-ord.clouds-stacks[.]com(delivery)ad.starx-net[.]com(exfiltration)america250[.]holiday,theowo[.]clubandadsprism-stat[.]com(impersonation and delivery)ads-it-assets[.]com,cdn.adv-static[.]com,wpvortex-mod[.]comandassets-int[.]com(redirects)
How Can Journalists and At Risk Users Protect Their Phones?
Update first, because Sekoia's own verdict is that "a user running an up-to-date operating system is safe from these attacks." Then add layers:
- Update iOS and Chrome now. Google's DarkSword analysis says iOS 26.3 fixes every DarkSword bug. On Android, run Chrome 146 or later plus the latest security update.
- Turn on Lockdown Mode. Apple's Lockdown Mode blocks "certain complex web technologies," and Google recommends it where updating is impossible. Google found it blocked APT29's 2024 iPhone exploit.
- Enable Advanced Protection on Android. Google's support page says it turns off Chrome's JavaScript optimizer and WebGPU, shrinking the browser surface these exploits hit.
- Revoke sessions if you were outdated. Sign out all sessions in email, messaging and cloud accounts, then change passwords saved in Chrome or Keychain.
- Take threat notifications seriously. Apple has sent spyware alerts to users in 110 countries; treat one as a reason to get a forensic check.
- Call a helpline. The Access Now Digital Security Helpline is free for journalists and civil society, runs around the clock and answers within two hours. Amnesty International's Security Lab takes forensic requests from civil society, capacity permitting.
What to Watch Next
Sekoia is working with national CERTs to find victims. Open questions: how many phones were hit, whether email bodies left any device, and whether Raffles guests were served the exploit. For more on state use of commercial exploits, see ICE's admission that it uses zero click spyware.